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McDowell’s Conceptualist Therapy for
Skepticism
Santiago Echeverri
Abstract: In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of
perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to
provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical
thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper
offers a reconstruction of McDowell’s view and shows that the
therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity
conception of truth he exploits is unable to sustain the idea that
perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing; 2) it
could be plausible only from an externalist point of view that is in
tension with the view of normativity that motivates conceptualism;
3) the identity conception of truth is incompatible with McDowell’s
recent version of conceptualism in terms of ‘non-propositional
intuitive contents’.
In the last few years, a picture of perceptual experience as a source of reasons has
emerged in the philosophical scene. This view interprets the epistemic status of
perception in terms of its role in the justification of doxastic states. Some of its
defenders claim that, if an account on these lines were not attained, the epistemic
character of perceptual experience would be threatened, leading to a form of
skepticism about the external world.
In this paper I shall focus on the conceptualist defense of this claim and, in
particular, on McDowell’s accounts of it: the picture he provides in Mind and
World, where concepts are conceived as constituents of facts, and his most recent
proposal, where concepts are conceived as actualized in non-propositional intuitive
contents (McDowell 2007, 2008a).
I am going to argue for the following claim: the conceptualist picture of
perceptual content as identical to facts does not provide a way out for skepticism
about the possibility of knowledge. Since this sort of skepticism is one of the
motivations for Davidson’s coherentism —one of the targets of McDowell’s main
argument— conceptualism fails on this count. If I am right, this paves the way for
a picture that takes beliefs as the minimal units of justification. Furthermore, if
one shows that the hypothesis that perceptual content is conceptually structured
doesn’t improve the coherentist view, one can argue that the content of
perception is non-conceptual. Before we reach these conclusions, it is necessary
to make some methodological remarks.
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1. Three Attitudes Against Skepticism
In the recent literature, different sorts of anti-skeptical projects have been
delineated. Following Pryor (2000: 517), one can distinguish ambitious anti-
skeptical projects from modest anti-skeptical projects. The former try to ‘refute the
skeptic on his own terms, that is, to establish that we can justifiably believe and
know such things as that there is a hand, using only premises that the skeptic
allows us to use’. If one intended to develop this project in the context of a theory
of perception, one should restrict evidence to bits of experience that don’t give
rise to doubt. In contrast, the modest anti-skeptical project purports ‘to establish
to our own satisfaction that we can justifiably believe and know such things as
that there is a hand, without contradicting obvious facts about perception’.
Modest projects come in different varieties. This is due to the fact that one can
engage with the skeptic, not by refuting him on his own terms but by bringing
into question the main assumptions of the skeptical challenge, or by providing an
alternative picture that looks more appealing than the skeptical stance. In this
sense, one can distinguish dogmatist projects from therapeutic projects. Dogmatists
claim permission to speak about perceptual knowledge (or justification), even
though they have no means to show that the skeptic is wrong; by contrast,
therapists go farther and promote a conversion of the skeptic.1 Whereas
dogmatists refuse to take skepticism seriously, therapists take it seriously,
although they think it worse to look for anti-skeptical arguments.2
Although therapists do not provide a refutation of the skeptic, their discourse
has a far-reaching normative character: it purports to give us reasons not to be
worried about skeptical problems. A source of inspiration for this project can be
found in Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Philosophical Investigations:
[T]he clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this
simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The authentic discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.— The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions that bring itself in
question. (Wittgenstein 1953, § 133: 51)
There is no recipe to prescribe therapies. However, all the therapists put forward
an alternative picture intended to supersede the skeptical outlook, i.e. a picture
that makes us capable of stopping doing philosophy. In this case, the picture
should enable us to stop trying to prove the skeptic is wrong. Hence, one can see
conceptualism as providing an alternative picture to skepticism and evaluate it
by measuring its potential to dissolve the skeptical challenge.3
I am sympathetic to the claim that sometimes a therapy is a better alternative
than a solution. My objections are not against the therapeutic strategy but against
the sort of therapy McDowell prescribes. To make an analogy with the medical
case: conceptualism is based on a mistaken diagnosis of the skeptical problem
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that motivates coherence theories; this has led it to prescribe the wrong treatment.
In other words, providing an adequate picture of perceptual content is orthogonal
to the task of dissolving skepticism.4
The remaining paper is in seven sections. Section 2 provides a reconstruction
of McDowell’s early version of conceptualism and shows how it is supposed to
dissolve skepticism. Sections 3 and 4 present objections against this therapeutic
project: I show that the identity conception of truth cannot forestall the
emergence of skepticism, and it is committed to a dubious ontology. Sections 5
and 6 present some ways of patching conceptualism, and show that they conflict
with its main motivations. Section 7 examines an objection against my reading of
the skeptical problem, and clarifies its relation to the debate on disjunctivist
views of perceptual experience. In section 8 I conclude that, as far as skepticism is
concerned, it is possible to take beliefs as the minimal units of justification, and
ascribe a non-conceptual content to perception.
2. The Conceptualist Therapy
Conceptualists assert that the content of perceptual experience is conceptual. To
be sure, the plausibility of this position depends on how one understands the
notion of a concept. McDowell has provided two versions of this claim. For the
time being, I shall focus on the earlier, more influential version. Later on, in
section 6, I shall briefly examine his most recent formulation of this claim.
According to the earlier formulation, one can define concepts as the
constituents of the content expressed by a ‘that’-clause, whenever it is preceded
by a psychological verb, like S believes that p, S thinks that p, S sees that p, etc. On
this approach, it is possible to be either a strong or a weak conceptualist. A strong
conceptualist holds that the content of experiences has the same structure as the
content of a ‘that’-clause. In some cases, the conceptualist moves to the weaker
claim that the content of experiences is wholly expressible by means of a ‘that’-
clause. Alternatively, he may hold that, although intentionality is essentially
conceptual, it is possible (even necessary) to introduce a non-conceptual level of
description that accounts for some of the ingredients of intentionality.5
McDowell describes the conceptual as ‘unbounded’ and paraphrases it by
saying that ‘there is nothing outside the conceptual’ (McDowell 2008b: 259). This
has led most readers to interpret him as a strong conceptualist. On this view, the
content of perceptual experiences is conceptual through and through. But this
conceptualism differs from other versions in a crucial point: it not only restricts
all forms of intentionality to the possession of concepts, but also claims that they
articulate the content of experiences. Thus, whereas doxastic theorists of
perception (or inferentialists) might be seen as denying that there is something
like a perceptual content endowed with semantic or intentional properties (for
only propositional states like judgments or beliefs represent the world),
McDowell claims that perceptual content is conceptual, i.e. that there is a pre-
doxastic level that already involves the actualization of concepts. As Brandom
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usefully puts it, ‘[h]e thinks that we need a notion of conscious experience that is
prejudgmental, but nonetheless through and through conceptually contentful’
(Brandom 1998: 369).
This view needs some qualification, though. To capture some details of
McDowell’s account, it seems necessary to examine his main argument.
Although he presents it quite informally, one can construe it in three steps. In
the first step, he presents a diagnosis of the skeptical problem. According to this
diagnosis, the source of skepticism about the external world is the same as the
source of worries about the possibility of content. In the second and third steps,
he provides something similar to an inference to the best explanation: he argues
that the best way of avoiding skepticism is to develop a conceptualist framework.
I suggest his argument is similar to an inference to the best explanation, for it
proceeds by elimination of alternatives. However, it is not an inference to the best
explanation, since his goal is not to provide an explanatory theory of experience. He
just wants to develop an alternative ‘picture’ that would help us think of
experience in a new way.
First Step: Diagnosis
In the Afterword to Mind and World, McDowell gives some hints on the nature of
his therapeutic project. He hypothesizes that traditional problems associated with
the possibility of knowledge and intentionality have a common source and,
therefore, that they require a common treatment:
I also assume that philosophical concerns about the possibility of
knowledge express at root the same anxiety as philosophical concerns
about how content is possible, an anxiety about a felt distance between
mind and world. Davidson and Rorty usually focus on concerns of the
former sort, whereas I focus on concerns of the latter sort; I take it that the
underlying thought is the same, that we ought to exorcize the feeling
of distance rather than trying to bridge the felt gap. (McDowell 1994:
146–47)6
It is difficult to understand how both issues are related and why a common
framework could be used for such different purposes. However, when we read this
paragraph in the light of some of McDowell’s papers on these topics, it seems
safe to ascribe to him the following two theses: 1) He seems to believe that a
skeptic is not in a position to recognize genuine forms of intentionality. In other
words, skeptics are unable to make sense of the mind as having a ‘world-view’. 2)
He appears to hold that a successful theory of content is sufficient to rule out
skepticism about the possibility of knowledge. In other words, offering a
conceptualist picture of the mind-world relation would promote the conversion
of the skeptic and show him that perceptual knowledge is possible.
I find the first claim attractive, but I cannot understand how it could be
connected with the conceptualist account of experience. Let me explain. Some
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versions of skepticism offer a picture of the mind as being intelligible without an
external world. Against these pictures, one can profitably sketch an externalist
account of content that dispels them. As McDowell (1986: 245) puts it, insisting
on ‘the interpenetration of inner and outer’ in a picture of intentionality can help
us conceive of the mind as situated in the world. However, this sort of strategy can
be developed without assuming that perceptual content is conceptual. One can go
externalist and deny conceptualism.7
Another version of skepticism, forcefully attacked by Davidson, arises from a
dualistic picture of scheme and content (for discussion, see McDowell 1999: 116–
17). This picture takes concepts as schemes wholly different from content. In
order to avoid this sort of view, one could reject the dualistic picture and conceive
of concepts, as they figure in perceptual judgments, as internally related to their
sensory content. However, in so doing, one is not committed to a pre-doxastic
version of conceptualism.
To sum up, one could sketch an externalist and non-dualistic account of
content but resist McDowell’s conceptualist picture of experience.8
These arguments lead us to the second claim. This sort of skepticism doesn’t
put the intentionality of experience in jeopardy, but the warrant of human
empirical thinking. But, how could a conceptualist avoid this sort of skepticism?
McDowell’s argument stresses the role of objectivity instead of that of knowl-
edge. His point seems to be that conceptualism is better suited than other views
to make room for human thinking as objectively constrained. Since being
objectively constrained is a necessary condition of empirical knowledge, showing
that empirical thinking is objectively constrained would contribute to developing
a picture where knowledge is possible.
Second Step: Some Alternatives
A first alternative would be to analyze objectivity as a result of the causal influence
of the external world in perceptual experience. This idea is present in empiricist
theories that introduce ‘sense impressions’, or ‘sense data’, as the basic materials
of empirical knowledge. Along with Sellars (1956) and Davidson (1982, 1986),
McDowell rejects this approach on the following ground: if one conceives
perception in these terms, its relation to perceptual beliefs can be causal, but not
normative. In other words, accommodating objectivity just in causal terms would
sever the normative relation between mind and world; perceptual experience
would be unable to offer reasons to justify perceptual beliefs. Thus, McDowell
writes:
[P]erhaps this picture secures that we cannot be blamed for what
happens at that outer boundary [of the space of reasons], and hence that
we cannot be blamed for the inward influence of what happens there.
What happens there is the result of an alien force, the causal impact of the
world, operating outside the control of our spontaneity. But it is one
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thing to be exempt from blame, on the ground that the position we find
ourselves in can be traced ultimately to brute force; it is quite another
thing to have a justification. In effect, the idea of the Given offers
exculpations where we wanted justifications. (McDowell 1994: 8)9
McDowell’s use of evaluative expressions like ‘blamed’ and ‘exculpations’
suggests that he has in mind an internalist view of justification. On this view, one
should not only show that we are warranted to hold p, but also that, in holding p,
we are ‘epistemically responsible’ for holding p. In some sense, McDowell’s view
contrasts with the one adopted by theorists who take it that the only normative
condition that could be imposed on perceptual states in order to be authoritative is
to be qualified as ‘reliable’, ‘accurate’, ‘true’ or ‘correct’.10 An approach along
these lines would commit one to a radical externalism about justification,
contrary to McDowell’s text. Although he doesn’t give further support for this
view, we shall accept it for the sake of the argument.11
The other alternative is to adopt a version of coherentism of the sort advocated
by Davidson. This position results from two main ideas: Davidson thinks that
coherentism follows from our incapacity to make sense of impressions as reasons
for knowledge. On the one hand, if we conceived of impressions on the model of
assertions, giving us a ‘message’ from the external world, they could not ground
perceptual knowledge in a satisfactory way. Intuitively, someone who gives a
message might be lying. ‘Since we can’t swear intermediaries to truthfulness, we
should allow no intermediaries between our beliefs and their objects in the
world’ (Davidson 1986: 144). On the other hand, if one understands perceptual
content as a causal impact of the external world, one won’t have real reasons,
because ‘nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief’
(141). Thus, Davidson claims that he could eventually develop a theory of
knowledge where perceptual states play no normative role in grounding
empirical beliefs, although he also thinks that his view could preserve objectivity
via the coherence of belief systems. The details of Davidson’s view are complex;
however, this introduction will do for the present purposes.
McDowell is sympathetic to Davidson’s diagnosis but not with his solution.
He thinks Davidson is right when he points out that only something that belongs
to the space of reasons, the realm of norms, can play the role of a reason. But he
also thinks Davidson is mistaken in saying that only beliefs can count as reasons
for holding other beliefs. As I understand him, he thinks this view is wrong on at
least three counts. From an epistemological point of view, coherentism cannot
make room for a genuine idea of objectivity, because perception, our more
immediate source of knowledge of the external world, does not play any epistemic
role. Second, in traditional philosophy, belief states are usually analyzed as
subjective states, i.e. as states that may be individuated independently of the
external world. Thus, McDowell thinks, if one were to hold that only beliefs
might count as reasons, one could hardly overcome Davidson’s imagery of a
‘self-contained’ thinking with no bearing on external reality. Third, a picture of
intentionality that does not ascribe any epistemic role to perception can hardly
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sustain the idea that mental states are about an external world. This is the basis of
what McDowell terms ‘minimal empiricism’.12
In order to avoid these difficulties, McDowell suggests that it is possible to
conceive perceptual states in such a way that they belong to the space of reasons,
although they don’t have the character of beliefs. For that purpose, he thinks it is
sufficient to show that perceptual states are conceptually structured. This is the core
of McDowell’s pre-doxastic conceptualist picture of experience.
Third Step: Treatment
As indicated above, McDowell does not present his view as an elaborate theory
of experience, but just as a ‘picture’. Seeing this picture as a possible outlook
should promote a philosophical conversion. To a first approximation, the
conceptualist claims that the content of experience is conceptual, for concepts are
not only exercised at the level of judgment, but also actualized at the level of
sensory intake or, in Kant’s jargon, at the level of receptivity.13 McDowell thinks
this move avoids the pitfall of the Myth of the Given, for it does not describe
perception as a brute causal impact; it also promises to avoid coherentism, for the
introduction of concepts in receptivity would dismantle Davidson’s imagery of a
self-contained thinking.
His hypothesis can be approached from two different perspectives. From a
psychological point of view, concepts are passively actualized. From an ontological
point of view, concepts should not be seen as ‘epistemic intermediaries’ between
mind and world but as constituents of the world. Both ideas may be summed up
in the thesis that perception offers an unmediated access to the world; in
experience, the subject passively actualizes a battery of concepts that also play the
role of constituents of reality.14
The identification of concepts with constituents of reality is the key to
understanding McDowell’s claim that he is in a position to offer a therapy for
skepticism. He characterizes perceptual content as different from belief, because
he wants to develop an alternative picture to Davidson’s coherentism.15 And he
identifies concepts with constituents of the world, for he is interested in
preserving objectivity: the idea of passivity accommodates the requirement of an
external constraint on thinking, and the idea of concepts as constituents of the
world offers the mind a direct access to ‘the layout of reality’.
McDowell does not provide a clear characterization of what he means by
concepts as constituents of the world. In some texts, he suggests that he exploits a
version of the identity conception of truth, according to which the truth of a thought
does not consist in the correspondence between that thought and something
different from it, but in its identity with a fact:
The point of my remarks about the identity of true judgeables with facts,
in their context, is to help bring out how if we conceive experience as I
have already recommended, as actualization of conceptual capacities in
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sensory receptivity, we can understand how in perception the world
itself has a rational impact on our thinking. (McDowell 2005: 85; see also:
87)
In Mind and World, McDowell links his account of concepts as the constituents
of thoughts with the Tractarian view of facts:
Given the identity between what one thinks (when one’s thought is true)
and what is the case, to conceive the world as everything that is the case
(as in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, § 1) is to incorporate the world into
what figures in Frege as the realm of sense. The realm of sense (Sinn)
contains thoughts in the sense of what can be thought (thinkables) as
opposed to acts or episodes of thinking. (McDowell 1994: 179; see also his
1992: 288 n 19; 2002: 134; and 2008b: 264)
McDowell emphasizes that his picture does not amount to a theory, since it
merely states a ‘truism’ beyond dispute. However, his appeal to Frege and
Wittgenstein suggests the opposite. First, Wittgenstein’s view of facts is in the
service of a correspondence theory of truth.16 Second, on Frege’s view, the realm
of reference is not made out of facts, but of things. In this sense, McDowell’s
picture is not a truism but a piece of constructive philosophy (I’ll come back to
this in section 6).
How does this putative truism provide the materials for a treatment of
skepticism? The discussion above suggests that we should focus on two points:
the notion of passivity and the identity between the contents of experiences and
facts. Does this proposal succeed in keeping objectivity without falling prey to
the Given? As indicated above, McDowell has provided two versions of this
picture. The early version may be divided in two parts:
First, he suggests that a picture of perceptual content as conceptually
structured may help us understand the rational transitions between perception
and belief without collapsing into an inferential model. As Sellars pointed out,
one of the main motivations for the Myth of the Given is the plausible idea that
there is a structural difference between the way we acquire knowledge from
perception and the way we acquire it from inference (Sellars 1956, § 1: 13).17
Hence, McDowell seems to think he is in a position to accommodate this insight,
because he does not identify the transition from perception to judgment with an
inferential move between doxastic states. Rather, he has in mind a link by
‘sameness’ of content. The passive actualization of concepts gives a conceptually
structured content that the subject ‘endorses’ in perceptual judgment.
Second, McDowell not only wishes to preserve the non-inferential character of
the grounding relation; he also thinks that, in so doing, he is not offering a
version of the Given. He seems to sustain this view on two claims: 1) Conceiving
perception as conceptual is supposed to make it ‘epistemically informed’. This
avoids positing a non-epistemic state as the basis of an epistemic state. 2) Seeing
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the content as conceptual seems to provide reasons. It offers reasons, for only
structured entities can figure in relations of justification.18
If McDowell were right, his model would have some advantages: 1) It could
keep the intuitive difference between thinking that something is the case and
experiencing it to be the case, given that not all perceptual contents are endorsed
in judgment. 2) This framework would not introduce a gap between experiencing
and thinking, since the contents of perceptual judgments would be the same as
the contents of perceptual experiences. 3) It would accommodate the intuition
that perception is a non-inferential source of knowledge. 4) Since perception-
judgment transitions are conceptual, it would provide a way out of the Given.19
So far, so good. Nevertheless, our question remains: does the above picture
provide a treatment for skepticism? At first sight, characterizing the content of
experiences as the same as the content of empirical judgments seems to introduce
a threat of idealism. As a matter of fact, McDowell himself suggests that his view
might be seen as a ‘domesticated’ version of Hegel’s idealism, a kind of idealism
that he finds innocent because it does not entail that the world is a product of the
mind’s activity. As our reconstruction made clear, McDowell says that the
identity holds between (true) thoughts and facts, not between thinking and facts.20
Hence, he does not claim that the mind ‘creates’ the world by its activity of
thinking, but just that, when a (true) thought is non-inferentially elicited by
perception, what one thinks is a fact. This seems to preserve the intuition that the
mind’s perceptual access to the world is direct. Perceptual experience is ‘openness
to facts’.
However, it is far from clear how these ideas might lead to a conversion from
skepticism. If one bears in mind that McDowell advertises his view as an
alternative to Davidson’s coherentism, one may wonder whether his appeal to
facts has a real pay-off. My claim is that it has no real pay-off. Let me explain:
One can interpret Davidson’s coherentism as an attempt to show that
coherence is necessary for knowledge, and that belief is intrinsically veridical
(Davidson 1990: 156). This line of thought is apparent in his rejection of epistemic
intermediaries. If there were epistemic intermediaries, the possibility of knowl-
edge would be threatened, given the skeptic’s qualms about the defeasible
character of perception (Davidson 1986: 144). To be sure, this is far from
providing sufficient conditions for knowledge. However, Davidson expects that
his argument would show that there is no reason to cast doubt on the possibility
of knowledge. That’s why he stresses that ‘there is a presumption in favor of the
overall truthfulness of anyone’s beliefs’ (146). A natural reading of this move is as
an attempt to block the skeptic’s demand of further reassurance, i.e. as a way of
‘telling him to get lost’ (1990: 154).
Since McDowell advertises conceptualism as an alternative to coherentism, he
is committed to showing that he can do better than Davidson. Minimally, one
could expect that, if conceptualism is right, there should be a presumption in
favor of the overall truthfulness of anyone’s perceptual beliefs. My claim is that the
conceptualist appeal to facts does not satisfy this requirement. That’s the main
claim of the next two sections.
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3. Using the Identity Thesis as a Therapy (I)
To a first approximation, McDowell might be seen as suggesting that perception
is factive. This fits well within the disjunctivist picture of experience.21 If I see that
there is a red cube, there is a red cube. However, conceptualism provides a
particular version of this claim: its strategy against skepticism is to say that there
is no gap between empirical thinking and the world just because the content of
perceptual judgments is the same as the content of the world. McDowell
accommodates factivity by positing an identity relation between the content of
perceptual experience and the facts.
How is this identity relation supposed to help? Solving this question would
require further elaboration of the identity thesis. The trouble here is that
McDowell insists that it is a ‘truism’. Since everybody can understand it, no
further elaboration is needed.
I think we could interpret part of the identity thesis if we examine the way it
exploits factivity. We can summarize it as follows:
(F) If one empirically thinks that something is the case, then the content of
one’s empirical thinking is a fact: Tp ! p.
Principle (F) can be interpreted in two different ways. In a strong reading, it
applies to any form of empirical thinking. In a weak reading, it is restricted to true
empirical thinking.
The strong reading is obviously false. After all, experiences can mislead us.
When we are misled, what we think is not the case. A natural way of making
sense of this possibility is to say that subjects make mistakes when they
empirically judge that things are thus and so. However, if one is interested in
making room for error, one needs an account of the contents of false empirical
thoughts. More generally, in order to be entitled to the weak reading, the
conceptualist has to say more about perceptual error.
The conceptualist could reply that mistakes are generated in the transition from
perceptual experience to perceptual judgment. One could develop this view in at
least two ways: according to the common content version, perceptual experience
would always present facts. Mistakes would arise at the level of judgment.
According to the dual content version, perceptual experience would present either
facts, or non-obtaining facts. McDowell suggests this view. In some texts, he
speaks of ‘misleading appearances’ or ‘mere appearances’ as if they were an
ontological category totally different from the facts presented in perception (see
McDowell 1995: 407 n 18). In other texts, he seems to suggest an opposition
between two sorts of facts, obtaining and non-obtaining facts: ‘If we are misled by
perceptual experience, what perception purports to reveal to us as something
that is the case is not something that is the case, and so is not a fact’ (McDowell
2005: 85; see also his 2006 and 2008b: 264).
In what follows, I shall argue that none of these models can satisfy the
following two desiderata: accounting for the possibility of error, and dissolving
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skepticism. I begin with what I take to be the more plausible view: the common
content view.
On the common content view, all perceptual experiences concern facts.
However, perceptual judgments can be true or false, given that not all
perception-judgment transitions lead to knowledge (or true belief). The problems
with this sort of view should be obvious: if perceptual judgments can be wrong,
there are at least some empirical judgments whose contents differ from the facts
presented in perception. This suggests that perception-judgment transitions would
not be so simple a matter as endorsing the contents presented in perception.
Instead, a transformation process has to take place when the mind goes from a
perceptual state to a judgment. If this analysis is correct, the conceptualist is not
entitled to promote his picture of experience as direct openness to facts. After all, one
of the motivations to introduce it was to show that the world exerts a constraint on
thinking. However, if the transition from perceiving to thinking involves a cognitive
transformation of content, the mind is not directly open to facts. To be open to facts,
the mind has to adopt the right attitude to them. But, why should a skeptic be
confident that one usually adopts the right attitude to perceptual contents?
This point can be framed in comparison with Davidson’s account. If Davidson
were right, there would be a presumption in favor of the overall truthfulness of
anyone’s beliefs. Hence, McDowell is required to show that it is reasonable to
assume that perception-judgment transitions are normally truth conducing. This
is the minimum required to dispel the skeptic’s demand of further reassurance.
However, McDowell’s picture merely shows that there are two sorts of
transitions, not that truth conducing transitions are frequent enough to dispel
the demand of further reassurance. In other words, he has shown that, if there are
true perceptual judgments, they are open to facts. However, we wanted to know
whether psychological states are, in general, open to facts.
The conceptualist might reply by arguing that, although he has failed to show
that our psychological states are, in general, open to facts, he has shown that
there is no gap between perceptual judgments and the world. After all, skeptics
usually look for a gap in which they can insert their knife.22 But, on the identity
conception of truth, if something is the case, it is the sort of thing one can think.
As McDowell (2006: 229) writes, such a claim enables us ‘to think we can have
environmental facts directly available to us’.
However, it is hard to see how this move can dispel the skeptic’s need of
justification. After all, the sort of skepticism that drives Davidson’s coherentism
is the (putative) absence of a general presumption that belief is veridical. But
there is nothing in the identity conception of truth to reinforce this presumption.
One might think that no therapy can guarantee that empirical thinking is, by
nature, veridical. Trying to provide such a guarantee would require engaging
with the skeptic on his own terms. But even in this reading, it is difficult to see
how the conceptualist could help us dissolve the skeptical challenge. As he has it,
perception-judgment transitions bifurcate into true and false judgments. Human
perceptual experiences provide, so to speak, opportunities for knowledge.
However, something in the picture is missing. There is no presumption that
McDowell’s Conceptualist Therapy for Skepticism 11
r 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
subjects take advantage of their opportunities for knowledge. For that purpose,
one would have to tell a story of how perception-judgment transitions lead to
knowledge or true belief, i.e. how falsity is excluded. However, McDowell
remains silent on this count. Trying to avoid the gap between empirical thought
and world, he has introduced a new gap between empirical thinking and world.
The conceptualist might try a different move. On his picture, there are two
sorts of transitions: some of them lead to the True, others to the False. Hence,
when one understands the picture, one thereby accepts that one can conceive of a
state as having factual content. And, of course, if conceptualism shows that
factive states are conceivable, there is a sense in which it entails that perceptual
knowledge is possible.
The trouble with this sort of view is that it would be effective only against a
very naı¨ve form of skepticism. As far as I know, nobody has ever claimed that
knowledge is not possible in the sense of not being conceivable. Actually, most
skeptics grant that empirical knowledge is conceivable. This is precisely the
subversive character of Cartesian skepticism. In the First Meditation, Descartes is
aware that most people assume that they have perceptual knowledge. What he
wants to show is that, despite their strong confidence, they could have no
perceptual knowledge. He argues for this claim, not by showing that perceptual
knowledge cannot be conceived but that the opposite situation is conceivable:
that I might be dreaming.
To sum up, one cannot claim that conceptualism does a therapeutic job if it
only shows that perceptual knowledge is conceivable. One has to show also that
it is unreasonable to cast doubt on our possession of perceptual knowledge (or at
least veridical perceptual belief). But, as things stand, the skeptic might still be
right: although perception gives us opportunities to know, humans could be
inclined not to take advantage of them.
McDowell is caught in a dilemma: if he makes room for the possibility of
perceptual error, he cannot improve Davidson’s therapeutic program. However,
if he doesn’t make room for the possibility of error, he is led to a highly
implausible theory of perceptual experience.
A natural reply would be to give up Davidson’s attempt to confer a
presumption in favor of the overall truthfulness of anyone’s perceptual beliefs. In
fact, we could read some of McDowell’s recent pronouncements on the skeptical
challenge along these lines. In these texts, he grants the possibility of perceptual
error and suggests that we should not care about skeptical scenarios: ‘I hold that
the way to take skepticism seriously is not to try to disprove the skeptical
scenarios’ (McDowell 2006: 237).
But, can this attitude really help? I don’t think so. I am not saying that there
should be a proof that skeptical scenarios don’t obtain. What I am saying is that a
good therapy should show that the conceivability of skeptical scenarios is not
sufficient to take them seriously. Now, the point is that any theory of experience
has to introduce two alternatives: True-leading and False-leading transitions.
This is sufficient to make sense of skeptical scenarios. One has to show that,
despite the existence of the two alternatives, skepticism is unreasonable.
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The conceptualist cannot improve the coherentist therapy, since he just
provides a new picture of perception-judgment transitions. His room for
maneuver is restricted to the new claim that perceptual intake is conceptual.
This makes no real difference, since that picture does not confer a presumption of
truthfulness in favor of the mind’s perceptual beliefs. Even worse: the hypothesis
of perception as openness to facts has no real pay-off, since coherentism also
satisfies the weak demand of making knowledge conceivable. After all, it doesn’t
deny the platitude that sensations might lead either to true beliefs, or to false
beliefs.
4. Using the Identity Thesis as a Therapy (II)
Let us take stock. In the previous section I objected that conceptualism doesn’t
improve the coherentist therapy, since it has failed to show that perception-
judgment transitions are usually truth conducing. Furthermore, the idea that
perception is openness to facts is irrelevant against skepticism, since the existence
of two sorts of transitions reveals that there is some sort of transformation
process from perception to judgment. This casts doubt on the original claim that
perception constrains empirical thinking. Finally, one cannot envisage the
therapeutic task as just aiming to show that perceptual knowledge is conceivable.
In this section, I want to go farther and show that things are even worse for
McDowell. When one takes seriously his Tractarian view of the world, he has
obvious problems to make room for perceptual error. Of course, McDowell grants
that people make perceptual mistakes. The point is that, if his appropriation of
the Tractarian ontology were right, perceptual error should be, strictly speaking,
impossible.
By hypothesis, ‘the world is made up of the sort of thing one can think’ or, as
Wittgenstein puts it, the totality of facts, not of things. Since the mind is situated
in the world, when it entertains an empirical thought, that thought can only be
identical to a fact. If it were not identical to a fact, the world would not be the
totality of facts. But, if the world is the totality of facts, how could the mind think
untruly? If it is able to think untruly, McDowell’s Tractarian ontology is false.
One could try to resist this objection. In what follows, I examine two lines of
reply.
First, one might argue that the ontology of facts is compatible with the idea
that the mind thinks untruly. The trouble is that, when it thinks untruly, it
inhabits, so to speak, a different (possible) world. The actual world is the totality
of facts. When thinking untruly, the mind’s thoughts concern ways the actual
world might be.
But this move is implausible. Consider the following situation. Pierre is
(empirically) thinking that a monster is approaching him. However, he is not
seeing a monster, but his father. When we describe Pierre’s situation, his
empirical content a monster is approaching me differs from the true content my
father is approaching me. In the actual case, he is scared; in the possible case, he
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would be confident. Different contents have different cognitive effects. However,
on a Tractarian ontology, Pierre’s content would not be his actual content, since
the content a monster is approaching me does not obtain in the actual world.
However, his psychological reaction can only be accounted for if Pierre’s content
is part of the actual world.
The point can be summarized as follows. On the first alternative, McDowell is
led to exclude false empirical thoughts from the actual world and, consequently,
to put them in a possible world. However, there is a sense in which some false
contents are part of the actual world. First, Pierre’s thought is causally efficacious
in the actual world. Second, there is a sense in which his thought partially bears
on worldly reality. After all, even if he is mistaken about the identity of the
person approaching him, he is right when he infers that someone is approaching
him. On McDowell’s Tractarian picture, Pierre’s empirical content cannot be part
of the actual world. Hence, it cannot play any causal role in the explanation of his
actual fright.23
The upshot of this discussion is that, if one wants to make sense of perceptual
error, one cannot merely argue, as we did, that perceptual error arises from the
perception-judgment transition. This view needs ontological fixing. This leads us
to the second alternative.
On the second alternative, it is necessary to patch the Tractarian picture of the
world, and include non-obtaining contents. This leads us to the dual content
view. As I anticipated above, McDowell seems to suggest this picture:
It is propositional content as such, not qua what is, say, seen or otherwise
known to be the case, that is bipolar. [. . .] It is its being seen or known to
be the case, not its being to the effect that things are one way rather than
another, that excludes the false pole, and this exclusion cannot be in any
genuine tension with the fact that things might have been otherwise.
(McDowell 2005: 86)
This passage suggests that the conceptualist cannot merely say that perceptual
error arises from perception-judgment transitions. He is committed to introduce
a bipolar ontology in his picture of the world: if I think truly, what I think is a fact:
Tt p ! p. Similarly, if I think falsely, what I think is a non-obtaining fact: Tf p !
not-p.
The trouble here is that this solution defeats the original therapeutic project.
Both Davidson and McDowell are on a par in their rejection of the skeptic’s
challenge to provide sufficient conditions for knowledge. But Davidson
promises, at least, a general presumption in favor of the overall truthfulness of
anyone’s beliefs. If McDowell’s ontology is right, the world is populated by non-
obtaining facts. This means that getting things right is very difficult. In order to
get things right, people have to be lucky enough to get attuned to the right facts.
But how our minds manage to do it is something McDowell doesn’t explain. He
says nothing on the way perception-judgment transitions manage to exclude
non-obtaining facts.
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How did we arrive at these implausible results? I think there is some lack of
clarity on the role of ‘intermediaries’ in this story. Davidson’s main reason to
reject them was that the skeptic could use them to exacerbate the possibility of
global defeasibility. However, the sort of unmediated access McDowell promises
cannot show that this possibility is unreasonable. When one thinks truly, what
one thinks is what is the case. Fair enough. The trouble here is that, as far as we
know, we could be inclined to think non-obtaining facts, and skepticism looms.
Some people might think that McDowell’s picture has an advantage over
Davidson’s. On Davidson’s account, all perceptual relations are explained in
wholly causal terms. Hence, even in the best cases, we are in an indirect relation
to the world. By contrast, if McDowell’s picture is right, it depicts the good cases
as bearing a more direct access to the world.
This line of reply leaves me unmoved. On the one hand, the aim was to
eliminate epistemic intermediaries, not causal intermediaries. Even if one endorses
McDowell’s view, one has to assume that causal processes mediate our
perceptual contact with the world. So, in that respect, all theories are on a par
(see Campbell 2002: chapter 6). The only way of taking some extra benefits of
McDowell’s view would be to eliminate causal intermediaries as well, but this
would lead to an extravagant position.
On the other hand, there is some reason to think that a coherence theory can
provide a better account of perceptual error. As Davidson points out in the
Introduction to Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, ‘to perceive that it is snowing
is, under appropriate circumstances, to be caused (in the right way) by one’s
senses to believe that it is snowing by the actually falling of snow’ (2001: xvi).
This picture allows for the possibility of truth and falsity, as McDowell’s
amended picture should allow. Nevertheless, conceptualism can accommodate
perceptual error only by advocating a dubious bipolar ontology where the world
is populated by obtaining and non-obtaining facts. By contrast, if coherentism is
right, perceptual error can be explained in terms of the subject’s doxastic
attitudes. Being perceptually mistaken results from the subject’s taking that things
are thus and so when they are not thus and so.24
These arguments show that conceptualism doesn’t provide the therapeutic
benefits it promised. McDowell advertises his framework as an alternative to
coherentism. Since Davidson’s worry with skepticism concerns the possibility of
knowledge, it is clear that McDowell’s conceptualism has no means to improve
Davidson’s therapy. McDowell’s view can only work on the assumption that the
world has obtaining and non-obtaining facts. This is the sort of side-effect one
should avoid when one prescribes a treatment.
5. An Externalist Response?
The arguments so far may be seen as providing indirect support for the claim that
beliefs are the minimal units of justification. If conceptualism cannot improve the
coherentist therapy, there is no reason to give up Davidson’s claim that nothing
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can count as a reason except another belief. In this section I shall exert some
pressure on the second claim: as far as skepticism is concerned, there is no reason
to deny that perception has non-conceptual content. For that purpose, I shall
focus on the nature of perceptual entitlement.
Let us assume that the conceptualist can show that there is a presumption of
truthfulness on perceptually based judgments. Then, the question arises: how
does my perceptual experience of p entitle me to hold p? The response to this
question depends on one’s methodological commitments and the way one
interprets the skeptical challenge: does the skeptic ask for internal reasons that I
am not a brain in a vat? Or does he ask for external reasons purporting to show
that I am not a brain in a vat?
These questions are tricky. When one frames the discussion in these terms, the
line between engaging with the skeptic on his own terms and prescribing a
therapy becomes thin. However, one can describe the skeptical challenge either
as internalist or externalist, in order to see what sort of therapy is required. If one
reads conceptualism as a picture of first-person experience, it should be possible to
use it as a therapy against internalist skepticism. But, if it is taken as a hypothesis
put forward from the theorist’s point of view, it could also deliver a therapy against
externalist skepticism.
From an internalist viewpoint, the conceptualist can argue that, in ordinary
contexts, the subject is aware of his experience of p as entitling him to believe that
p. This awareness should be sufficient to show that it is unreasonable to ask for
further evidential support. From an externalist point of view, perceptual
experience would provide the subject with a direct access to the world, although
he would not be in a position to rule out skeptical scenarios just by considering
the character of his experiences. Let us explore the merits of each proposal.
From an externalist point of view, one can stipulate that perception-judgment
transitions are structured in such a way that perceiving (normally) yields
knowledge (or true belief). Many people follow this path. They argue that,
although perception is defeasible, it is reliable enough to yield true belief,
warranted belief or knowledge. Another approach, advocated by disjunctivism,
takes it that perceptual states ground perceptual beliefs because their structure
differs from that of hallucinatory (or illusory) states. According to some
influential versions of disjunctivism, perceptual states must be individuated by
the (true) facts they present and not by mental episodes that fall short of facts. By
parity of reasoning, if a subject is in a perceptual state, his perceptual beliefs are
warranted, even though he does not know whether he is in a perceptual, or in a
hallucinatory state.25
The present proposal suggests that conceptualism promises a compromise
between epistemic internalism and externalism: it ascribes accessible reasons to
the subject, but it does not provide her with access to the factivity of her reasons.
As Pritchard (2008: 287 n 8) puts it, conceptualism so understood introduces a
picture where one ‘only needs reflective access to the supporting grounds for
one’s belief and not also to the fact that they are supporting grounds’. (For a
similar view, see Brewer 1999: 100 n 6.)
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Suppose one favors a solution along these lines. In this case, one may wonder
whether it really coheres with the conceptualist view of epistemic justification. If
one recognizes that the ‘goodness’ of the reasons provided by perception is
justified from the theorist’s viewpoint, this undermines the motivation to
conceive experience as conceptual. Recall that McDowell condemns theories of
non-conceptual content, since they provide ‘exculpations’ when we want
‘justifications’. However, if the subject has no reflective access to the factivity
of her reasons, there is a clear sense in which experience provides her
exculpations, instead of justifications.
One could reply that the demands of responsibility are lower in ordinary
contexts. If there are no reasons for doubt, the subject is entitled to take her
experiences at face value, even though he has no access to the ‘goodness’ of the
reasons they provide. But this reply would miss the target of the present
argument. Of course, any theory of perceptual experience should find a
compromise between internalist and externalist intuitions (see Dretske 2000:
601). The trouble here is that there is no reason to take the conceptualist
compromise as the only possible one. A non-conceptualist can challenge it by
saying that he could find a different compromise position between internalist and
externalist intuitions. Let me develop the point in some detail.
When one inquires whether a particular content, say p, may count
as a good reason, one has to adopt an external point of view on p. If I ask
whether my perceptual experience of p provides me a good reason to think that p,
in so doing, I implicitly place myself at a vantage point external to my perceptual
experience. If I doubt whether I am seeing a red wall in front of me, it will not
help me to consider the intrinsic features of experience. To decide whether I am
seeing a red wall in front of me, i.e. whether experience provides me good
reasons, I have to consider aspects external to it, like the lighting conditions,
whether my visual system is working properly, and so on. At that point, my
epistemic position is not the same as the epistemic position I was in before I
raised the doubt.
The critical point here is that a subject can only appreciate the ‘goodness’ of a
reason p by occupying an external point of view on p. If this is so, it seems
superfluous whether this reason is conceptual or not, or whether it is accessible to
the subject of experience or not. Its ‘goodness’ as a reason is independent of its
conceptual character. Its conceptual character is designed to make it accessible to
the subject, whereas its ‘goodness’ is a matter of assessing it from an external
viewpoint. Hence, one might take perceptual content as non-conceptual. One
might take it as accessible to the subject only at the level of judgment. And her
epistemic appraisal of her judgments would involve the perspectival shift we all
need when we examine whether a reason is a good reason.
The upshot of the discussion is two-fold: if the only argument to introduce
conceptual contents is to avoid introducing exculpations instead of justifications,
it won’t do. Everybody needs, at one moment or the other, to be exculpated by
introducing an externalist ingredient in epistemology. If one aims at finding an
epistemological compromise between internalist and externalist intuitions, it is
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possible to accommodate them within a theory of non-conceptual content, where
the ‘goodness’ of reasons is assessed at the level of judgment.
On the face of it, McDowell might try another solution. Instead of providing an
externalist picture that entails that perception is a source of good reasons, he
could attempt to show, from inside, that it is reasonable to think that experience
normally offers good reasons. He could do it by conceiving of experiences as
having a self-authenticating character. When I am in a good case, experience
somehow ‘displays’ its entitling character.
There are ways of construing this claim without relapsing into the Myth of the
Given. One of the hallmarks of perceptual experiences is that they present their
objects as being ‘there’. Ordinary subjects don’t take their experiences as if they
were copies or reproductions of objects. Instead, they feel that objects are
immediately present. One might take the feeling of presence as (partially)
explaining the entitling character of perceptual experiences (see Pryor 2000).
I think this line of reply has some merits. However, there are two objections
against it. First, there is no direct connection between the conceptualist picture of
experience and the entitling role of perceptual presence. Second, it is difficult to
see how phenomenology could be used as a therapy for skepticism about the
possibility of knowledge. As Wright (2002) points out, a pervasive characteristic of
skeptical scenarios is that they introduce undetectable changes in the epistemic
context: one is asked to imagine mules cleverly disguised as zebras, brains-in-
vats whose experiences are indiscriminable from experiences of an external
world or people dreaming while asking whether they are awake. The therapist
should work harder to dispel the prima facie plausibility of these cases. He should
show that, although these cases are conceivable, there is no reason to take these
possibilities as nearby possibilities.
6. Intuitive Conceptual Content?
In recent writings, McDowell (2007, 2008a) has introduced a new way of
developing conceptualism. This new account reveals continuities with some
suggestions presented so far, but also crucial discontinuities. As our arguments
made clear, it is necessary to make room for perceptual error, without incurring a
dubious ontology of non-obtaining facts. In his recent view, McDowell introduces
a distinction between the content of perceptual judgments and the content of
experiences. This makes the possibility of error more vivid. However, the new
picture rejects the old assumption that perceptual content is propositional,
threatening the anti-skeptical application of the identity conception of truth.
As far as I know, McDowell does not motivate his new view by invoking the
sort of arguments presented here. However, the new picture has the potential of
avoiding some of the worse aspects of the Tractarian ontology. If the contents of
the world are not propositional, one is not forced to introduce non-obtaining
facts. After all, one can conceive of the world as the totality of things, not of facts.
The trouble here is that, as far as I understand him, McDowell seems to think that
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his new view is still compatible with the identity thesis, partly because he thinks
it is a truism (see, e.g. his 1995: 402 n 10, 407 n 17; 2008a: § 1 and 2008b: 247). In
what follows, I shall suggest that, although the new picture is better than the
original one, it cannot be used as a therapy for skepticism.
McDowell credits this new picture to Kant’s notion of intuitive content. On
this view, there are two levels of conceptual content: first, in perceptual
experience, concepts are actualized in a non-propositional way. Intuiting
amounts to a ‘having in view’. McDowell borrows Kant’s idea that intuitions
do not provide a sheer multiplicity, but have some sort of formal unity. In the case
of vision, he hypothesizes that experiences draw ‘on conceptual capacities
associated with concepts of proper and common sensibles’ (McDowell 2008a: 4).
He is not quite explicit on the nature of this unity. However, he argues that the
sort of unity provided by intuitions is conceptual, despite its non-proposition-
ality. By contrast, perceptual judgments would have a propositional content. This
content would involve the exercise of more specific recognitional concepts.
McDowell introduces the new picture by considering the following case.
Suppose I form a perceptual judgment I would express by uttering the sentence
‘That’s a cardinal’. In this case,
. . . my experience makes the bird visually present to me, and my
recognitional capacity enables me to know noninferentially that what I
see is a cardinal. Even if we go on assuming my experience has content,
there is no need to suppose that the concept under which my
recognitional capacity enables me to bring what I see figures in that
content. (McDowell 2008a: 3)
On this picture, McDowell accommodates the non-inferential character of
perception-judgment transitions, not by means of an identity relation but by a
different kind of process. He envisages two sorts of scenarios. In some cases, the
discursive activity makes some of the contents already present in the intuition
explicit. In other cases, the discursive activity goes beyond the intuition. However,
in both scenarios, ‘the entitlement derives from the presence to one of the object
itself, not from a premise for an inference, at one’s disposal by being the content
of one’s experience’ (McDowell 2008a: 12).
This model can be illustrated by our previous example. If I were to utter the
sentence ‘That’s a bird’, my statement would make the content of the intuition
explicit. I would be entitled to my judgment just because the concept bird was
already actualized in the intuitive content. By contrast, if I were to utter the
sentence ‘That’s a cardinal’, my judgment would go beyond the content of the
experience and, hence, it would be grounded, only in part, on the content of
intuition. The probability of perceptual error would be conditional on the
potential mismatches between the intuitive content and the exercise of
recognitional concepts. Clearly, the probability of being mistaken by uttering
the sentence ‘That’s a cardinal’ would be higher than the probability of being
mistaken by uttering ‘That’s a bird’.
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I think this sort of model provides some insights, as I explain elsewhere.26
However, this picture can only be validated if there is a principled way of
drawing the line between intuitive contents and the contents of judgment. Strictly
speaking, there is no reason to take the concept bird as the content of experience.
That’s why, when one presses the point, the conceptualist is led to conceive of the
content of intuition as including only concepts of proper and common sensibles:
shape, size, position, movement or its absence. ‘We think of common sensibles
accessible to sight as including, for instance, postures such as perching and
modes of locomotion such as hopping or flying’ (McDowell 2008a: 5).
If one makes this move, it becomes less clear how the new model could be
used as a therapy for skepticism. If there are intuitive conceptual contents, there
are not two cases, but only one: our perceptual judgments always go beyond
intuitive contents. Ordinary perceptual judgments are not of the form ‘that
moving object is thus and so’, but of the form ‘that’s a bird’, ‘that’s a cardinal’,
‘that’s my pet’, etc. If intuitive contents only actualize concepts of common and
proper sensibles, all perception-judgment transitions have to enrich the content
presented in intuition. Ordinary judgments do not consist in making something
explicit. They involve, rather, a construction process.
This is bad news for skepticism. The skeptic is worried about the possibility of
perceptual error. If McDowell is right, there is a sense in which all perceptual
judgments are wrong, since all perceptual judgments go beyond intuitive
contents. Perceptual judgments involve the exercise of concepts that are not
‘given’ in experience.
In order to resist this conclusion, one would have to introduce a new
ontological level. One might draw a line between the object cardinal, the content
of intuition and the concept cardinal. But this would lead us too far from the
therapeutic strategy delineated before. McDowell has insisted for many years
that the identity conception of truth is a truism: when I see that p, then p. On the
new account, this putative ‘truism’ is obviously false when applied to perceptual
experience. Strictly speaking, I cannot see that p, since the content of perception is
intuitive, not propositional. What I can do is judge that p. If one is optimist, one
can take this picture as making room for a relation of correspondence. One can
conjecture that being shaped so and so stands in a many-one relation to being a bird,
and being a bird stands in a many-one relation to being a cardinal, etc. If the content
of perceptual judgments does not figure in intuitive content, one needs a
transformation process to go from perceptual states to perceptual judgments.
The trouble is that this picture makes facts inaccessible to cognition: in order to
be open to facts, the subject would need direct access to them. If the subject only
has conscious access to facts by thinking that thus and so, he does not have direct
access to facts. Facts are rational elaborations of reality. Reality is given in
intuition, but conscious access starts at the level of judgment. This was
Davidson’s (1986: 142) point when he insisted that being aware of a sensation
‘is just another belief’. It doesn’t matter whether one takes the materials for this
awareness as conceptual. The point still applies: since intuitive content is not
accessible qua intuitive content, skeptics obsessed with defeasibility shall
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find no relief in a picture that posits an intuitive content as the rational basis of
judgment.
Let me develop this point in a different way. McDowell’s aim of conceiving
concepts and intuitions as intrinsically related is valuable. I myself take it as an
adequacy requirement for any theory of perception. However, it is misleading to
paraphrase intuitive content as a ‘having in view’. If McDowell’s picture of
intuitive content is right, it cannot be a having in view, i.e. it cannot reflect our
phenomenal access to the world. Ordinary visual experience is not merely about
shapes, positions or movements. Intuitive content is rather introduced as a
hypothesis from the third-person point of view. If intuitive concepts described the
first-person perspective, it would be easier to understand what McDowell means
by ‘intuitive content’, and one would expect to find a widespread consensus on
the matter. However, it is not clear which concepts are part of the contents of
experience, and which are part of the content of perceptual judgments. If it were
obvious, it would be hard to explain why McDowell took the content of
experiences to be propositional for so many years.
This line of reasoning suggests that, if McDowell is right on the nature of
intuitive content, we have to give up the picture of perceptual experience as direct
access to facts. Perceptual experience is not open to facts, because proposition-
ality is available only at the level of judgment. This lack of directness leads us to
the starting point: how is perceptual knowledge possible? If perceptual
knowledge is factive, perceptual knowledge is not possible unless there are
facts accessible to perceptual judgments. But intuitive content, lacking proposi-
tional structure, does not provide facts. Hence, perceptual knowledge needs
something that intuitive contents cannot provide. Bad news for skepticism . . .
7. Fallibility, Disjunctivism, and Conceptualism
One might argue that the arguments presented above rest on a misunderstanding
of the skeptical problem. I have assumed so far that, for McDowell’s therapy to
improve Davidson’s treatment, it should show that there is a standing
presumption in favor of the truth of our perceptual beliefs. However, this
assumption seems to rest on the claim that skepticism arises from our fallibility
alone. As a referee for this journal pointed out to me, ‘that one may on any
particular occasion be unknowingly in error does not entail that we lack beliefs
which are on the whole true and which on the whole amount to knowledge’.
With this diagnosis in mind, ‘McDowell’s idea is to show how, in the ‘‘good’’
case, one’s perceptual experiences can be such as to give us the kind of
reflectively accessible factive rational basis for our beliefs which would suffice for
knowledge’. As a result, his therapy:
. . . doesn’t deny that agents cannot distinguish between the good case
and the parallel ‘bad’ case (in this sense the fallibility remains), but his
claim is precisely that we should not let the bad case determine the
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epistemic support that our beliefs enjoy in the good case. Thus, contra the
skeptic, there is no standing reason to suppose that knowledge is
impossible, since McDowell’s approach has shown how it is in fact
possible; indeed, how paradigmatically it is possessed.
As I understand the present objection, it is based on two points: the role of
fallibility in the diagnosis of the skeptical problem, and a tacit conception of what
a satisfactory treatment should provide.
Concerning the first point, I think we could distinguish between subjective
fallibility and objective fallibility. To a first approximation, the former is related to
the agent’s capacity to know whether she is in a good or in a bad case, only by
exploiting cognitive resources available to her from her point of view (e.g.
reflection, memory, inference, etc.). By contrast, the latter notion is related to the
question whether, as a matter of fact, a subject is in a good or in a bad case; to put it
differently, the question is whether she actually knows the external world, or is
capable of knowing it, independently of whether she is in a position to know that
she knows it.
Concerning the second point, it is possible to distinguish McDowell’s line of
argument in his well-known papers on disjunctivism from his line of argument in
his conceptualist view of perceptual experience. Although both lines of argument
bear interesting relations to each other, and McDowell tries to harmonize them,
they are potentially dissociable. In this paper I was mainly interested in the latter
line of argument, i.e. in the potential of conceptualism to dissolve skepticism, and
not in the disjunctivist account of perceptual experience. However, I also think
some of the points made earlier also apply against the latter strategy. Let me
explain.
McDowell’s disjunctivist strategy against the skeptic rejects the Cartesian idea
that, for knowledge to be possible, the agent should be subjectively infallible. I
think McDowell rightly emphasizes that this line of thought presupposes a
contentious view of the mental as an autonomous realm completely transparent
to the subject. (See McDowell 1982: 389–390 and 1986: 236–237, 240.) As he points
out, it would be ‘epistemologically disastrous—to suppose that fallibility in a
capacity or procedure impugns the epistemic status of any of its deliverances’
(1986: 232). These two remarks make it possible to develop a disjunctivist account
of experience, according to which the subject can be in a good case even though
she cannot tell whether she is in a good or in a bad case.
As I see it, my requirement of a presumption in favor of the truth of our
perceptual beliefs doesn’t require any sort of subjective infallibility. This
requirement is just formulated from the theorist’s point of view. In Davidson’s
case, the putative presumption in favor of the overall truth of our belief systems
is a conclusion he reaches from an external point of view, i.e. by developing a
philosophical account of belief. As McDowell (1994: 16) acknowledges, Davidson
tries to ground this conclusion ‘by connecting belief with interpretation, and
urging that it is in the nature of interpretation that an interpreter must find her
subjects mostly right about the world with which she can observe them causally
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interacting’. This is an externalist move: Davidson does not claim that ordinary
agents have a direct access to the veridicality of their beliefs.
In McDowell’s case, it is possible to formulate the same requirement from an
external point of view. Assuming that there are two sorts of perception-judgment
transitions, why should the skeptic grant that perception leads to true
judgments? Why shouldn’t he claim, for instance, that only 1% of our
perception-judgment transitions lead to the True? As far as I can see, this sort
of reply is orthogonal to the quality of the subject’s first-person access to the
factivity of her own mental states. After all, the arguments presented above don’t
exploit the subject’s inability to know which disjunct, the True or the False, is in
question. The aim of the arguments was rather to show that, on McDowell’s
conceptualist picture(s), it is not clear how there can be factive cognitive states.
This point is easily overlooked when one focuses on the formulation of the
disjunctivist picture as presenting two possibilities. The bulk of the paper is to
show that one has to earn the entitlement to talk about the two disjuncts, instead
of assuming that subjects are usually led to the True.
This leads us to the second point. The objection assumes that it is sufficient to
depict two sorts of cases, as the disjunctivist has them, in order to show that
knowledge is in fact possible. However, what I have said so far suggests the
opposite view. As I explained in the analysis of the therapeutic program, the
therapist purports to earn the right not to worry about traditional problems in
two steps: first, he diagnoses the skeptical problem by spelling out its
assumptions. (See McDowell 1994: 142 n 17, 155 n 30.) Second, he tries to earn
the right not to worry about skepticism by providing a treatment, i.e. by
sketching an alternative picture where the original worries disappear. I think
McDowell fails in the latter task because he mistakenly assumes that the root of
the problem of knowledge is the same as that of the issue of how content is
possible. But, if my arguments are right, the problem of skepticism is not merely
a problem of content. It is also related to the sorts of processes that lead to
knowledge. When one inquires into the details of McDowell’s account of
perception-judgment transitions, the old worries reappear and the putative
entitlement not to worry about traditional problems is revealed as illusory. That’s
why I think disjunctivism cannot fully earn the right not to worry about
skepticism. One cannot just assume there are two possibilities, True-conducing
and False-conducing transitions. A story must be told about the way falsity gets
excluded in the transition from perception to judgment. But, as I argued at
length, McDowell’s conceptualism doesn’t succeed in that task.
One can put the point in the following way: the disjunctivist account of
experience can be seen as stating the form of a treatment of skepticism. That’s
why it can be dissociated from McDowell’s conceptualist framework. As
McDowell (1995) puts it, in the good case we are cognitively presented with
facts. The disjunctive strategy works against a skeptic that is ready to grant that
there is an adequate conception of perception-judgment transitions. However, if
one is faced with a skeptic that inquires into the nature of these transitions, the
therapy must be completed. Here is where conceptualism comes into scene. It is
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introduced as an account of the way human understanding ‘interacts’ with
sensibility, i.e. as a picture of the perceptual content underlying perceptual
judgment. The trouble here is that the conceptualist proposals don’t entitle us to
state the True side of the disjunction. The disjunction assumes that a ‘cognitive
purchase on an objective fact’ (McDowell 1995: 402) is possible. But this is
precisely what I have tried to question. One cannot merely stipulate that a
cognitive purchase on an objective fact is possible. If one is providing a picture of
perception-judgment transitions, one has to show how it makes a cognitive
purchase on an objective fact possible.
McDowell is right that such a cognitive purchase is not possible if one has a
Cartesian view of mind, where reasons are conceived as internal. However, my
point is that such a cognitive purchase is not possible either, if one holds a
conceptualist view of perception-judgment transitions. McDowell’s program can
be seen as combating the Cartesian picture where truth and world are external to
the mind (McDowell 1982: 390–391). My point is that getting rid of that view is
not sufficient. One also needs an adequate theory of how perception and
judgment are connected with each other.27 Why do I think that he hasn’t
succeeded in that program? Let me summarize some of the arguments presented
here:
The radical separation between thinking and content makes the grasp of the
right facts difficult to understand. Facts are external to the exercise of concepts in
judgment. However, what one needs to be in a good case is to have facts
accessible to judgment. This becomes clear when one realizes that knowing is a
propositional attitude and, as a result, it is not sufficient to conceive of perception
as openness to facts. One also has to tell a story about the way these perceptually
presented facts reach thinking.
However, things get messy when one takes seriously the suggestion of
introducing non-obtaining facts (or ‘mere’ appearances) in the world, in order to
make sense of perceptual error. If the mind is located in a world that is populated
by non-obtaining facts (or ‘mere’ appearances), the possibility of getting things
right rests on sheer luck. Here I should not be interpreted as claiming that
epistemology should restrict itself to a luck-free zone. (See McDowell 1995: 406 n
15.) Instead, what I mean is that one’s framework should not generate additional
requirements of epistemic luck. As McDowell has taught us, dualistic frame-
works exacerbate the need for additional favors from the world. If perception
provides either facts or non-obtaining facts, one requires additional luck to get
knowledge. The point here is not that we should look for a luck-free zone, but
instead conceive of perception-judgment transitions in a non-dualistic way, in
order not to require an additional amount of good fortune.28
Even if the reader doesn’t find these objections persuasive, he should take
seriously the incompatibility of the original anti-skeptical strategy with
McDowell’s more recent views on intuitive conceptual contents. The problems
this picture presents can be easily generalized to any transformational account of
perception-judgment transitions. These pictures cast doubt on the ontology of
facts, given that they threaten the seemingly ‘commonsensical’ identity thesis.
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Any transformation model is committed to a correspondence theory between
different levels and, as a result, it cannot guarantee that facts be directly
accessible to cognition. Moreover, if one’s view entails that propositionality is
available only at the level of judgment, it is not clear how there could be
perceptual knowledge. This point is crucial in the light of McDowell’s earlier
contention that, in order to have perceptual knowledge, facts themselves must be
given as the justifiers of our cognitive attitudes.
8. Final Remarks
Skepticism about the possibility of knowledge is usually based on the possibility
of introducing skeptical scenarios. Philosophers usually take the exclusion of
these scenarios as necessary to refute it. In the present article, I took for granted
that, even if we cannot meet that standard, we can show that skeptical scenarios
are not nearby possibilities. That’s why I asked whether conceptualism could do
better than Davidson and argued in favor of a general presumption that
perceptual beliefs are veridical.
My conclusion is that conceptualism fails on this count. The best thing it can
do is show that perceptual processes bifurcate into true and false judgments. The
trouble is that this was already provided by doxastic theories of justification.
Furthermore, doxastic views have a further merit: they don’t introduce non-
obtaining facts. In this sense, there are good reasons to keep Davidson’s claim
that belief states are the minimal units of justification.
On the other hand, careful examination suggests that any account of
perception-judgment transitions has to introduce different levels of analysis.
They are required to make room for the possibility of perceptual error and to find
a compromise between internalist and externalist intuitions. The defender of non-
conceptual content could press this point in support of his cause.
It should be stressed that I am sympathetic to a reaction to skepticism along
the lines indicated above, i.e. a rejection of some tacit assumptions of the
skeptical challenge. My point is that McDowell provides a wrong diagnosis of
skepticism; this leads him to provide the same treatment both for a picture based
on a questionable scheme-content dualism and a picture that casts doubt on the
possibility of knowledge.
McDowell is certainly right when he reacts against Davidson’s imagery of
thinking as a self-contained game, as when he claims: ‘we can’t get outside our
skins to find out what is causing the internal happening of which we are aware’
(Davidson 1986: 144). This suggests that we cannot get outside our beliefs
(McDowell 1994: 16). It is clear that we do not need to get outside our skins to
reach the world. It is by being in our skins that the world is available to us. But
these remarks are inessential to the main points Davidson makes. What drives
him is the aim of showing that we are not obliged to justify all our beliefs. We can
trust them. Thus, I assume that McDowell was misled by the self-containment
imagery.
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I hope the arguments presented here provide support for the project of
reconciling the theory of perceptual entitlement with Davidson’s claim that
‘nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief’. His
dictum does not entail that human thinking is a self-contained game. One can
attempt to rehabilitate that insight by conceiving of perceptual beliefs as the
minimal units of justification. One could try to endow them with a presumption
of being right by showing that they are intrinsically related to non-conceptual
perceptual processes. Of course, when one attempts to specify this connection, it
becomes plausible to conceive of belief systems as integral parts of embodied








1 Wright (2002, 2008) doesn’t seem to distinguish the therapeutic project from the
dogmatic one. Pryor (2000: 517) also conceives of dogmatism as having a therapeutic aim.
2 ‘But let me remark that my move is not well cast as an answer to skeptical challenges;
it is more like a justification of a refusal to bother with them’ (McDowell 1995: 408 n 19; see
also his 2006: 235). The term ‘dogmatism’ is unfortunate, since it is usually taken to
preclude criticism.
3 This is not the only motivation in McDowell’s writings. In other papers, he has
insisted that his conceptualist picture of experience would offer an adequate approach to
intentionality. I criticize this version of conceptualism in Echeverri (submitted).
4 My point can be captured in a different way: the theory of content should remain
dogmatic concerning skepticism.
5 A prominent example is to be found in Kant, who distinguishes intuitions from
concepts. Sellars’ case is also clear: whereas he thinks that intentionality is language-
dependent, he urges the introduction of ‘sense impressions’ as theoretical entities. See
Sellars 1956, 1968. For a critique of McDowell’s interpretation of Sellars, see: DeVries 2006,
and McDowell’s 2008b reply.
6 See also McDowell 1986: 259; 1995: 409. In many writings he suggests a double
reading of conceptualism: ‘And surely there must be such grounding if experience is to be
a source of knowledge, and more generally, if the bearing of empirical judgements on
reality is to be intelligibly in place in our picture at all’ (1994: 5). See also 1994: 6, 15, 66. In
other texts, McDowell labels his view ‘transcendental’ and emphasizes that it would put
an end to traditional obsessions with skepticism. See McDowell 1998a: 366.
7 I am indebted here to Dodd’s (2000: 78 n 11) illuminating discussion.
8 I sketch that picture in Echeverri (in preparation).
9 See also: ‘[I]f one attributes epistemological significance to what is given in
experience, so conceived, one tries to construe as a justification what could be at best be an
exculpation’ (McDowell 1998a: 365).
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10 The view of perceptual normativity in terms of ‘accuracy’ or ‘correctness’ is
endorsed by Peacocke (2001, 2004) and Burge (2003). However, they also introduce a
reliability requirement of belief-formation. Brewer (2006) and Gaskin (2006) interpret
McDowell’s emphasis on normativity in terms of ‘accuracy’ or ‘correctness’. If they were
right, McDowell’s insistence on conceptualism as a way of introducing normativity would
be ill motivated. For an analysis of the conceptualist picture of normativity, see Echeverri
(submitted).
11 In fact, many critics think that one could counter McDowell’s argument by
advocating a form of externalism. This response cannot satisfy the conceptualist picture of
normativity. In a recent text, McDowell (2008a: 13) acknowledges the ‘internalist’
orientation of this line of argument.
12 ‘That is what I mean by ‘a minimal empiricism’: the idea that experience must
constitute a tribunal, mediating the way our thinking is answerable to how things are, as it
must be if we are to make sense of it as thinking at all’ (McDowell 1996: xii). In his 2003:
158–59, McDowell provides further arguments against Davidson’s view. I examine them in
Echeverri (in preparation).
13 Brewer (1999, 2005) defends a similar view. Both theories differ from Noe¨’s 1999
conceptualism, since he introduces concepts at the level of judgment. For a recent
pronouncement on the pre-judgmental actualization of concepts, see McDowell 2008b:
228-ff.
14 For a discussion of this aspect of McDowell’s view, in relation to Jennifer Hornsby’s
developments of the identity conception of truth, see Dodd 2000: 174–86.
15 McDowell (1994: 144) acknowledges this point.
16 See Wittgenstein 1921: 2.173, 2.21, 2.221, 2.222, 2.223, 4.05, 4.06.
17 The main difficulty is to preserve the non-inferential character of perception
without falling in a version of the Myth. However, not all theorists understand immediacy
as synonymous with non-inferential. See Pryor 2000: 524–25.
18 This condition is dropped in McDowell’s more recent formulation of conceptualism.
This has some negative implications for the anti-skeptical project, as I argue in section 7.
19 For a critical analysis of these claims, see Echeverri (submitted).
20 ‘It is central to Absolute Idealism to reject the idea that the conceptual realm has an
outer boundary, and we have arrived at a point from which we could start to domesticate
the rhetoric of that philosophy’ (1994: 44; see also 1996: ix). ‘A thought, in Frege’s sense, is
what one thinks (or says) if one thinks (or says) something, as opposed to the thinking of it’
(McDowell 2005: 83; see also the discussion in: 2002). McDowell’s commitment to a form of
idealism has been denounced by many critics: Friedman 1996, Engel 2001 and Dingli 2005:
58, 63.
21 See McDowell 1982, 1995, 2005: 86. For a critical assessment of this view, see
Pritchard 2003. I’ll try to be more explicit on the relation of conceptualism to disjunctivism
in section 7.
22 I owe this formulation to Evans 1982: 225.
23 I am indebted to Je´roˆme Dokic for pressing me on this point.
24 Dokic (2000, forthcoming) examines the effects of including bipolar states of affairs
in the world. In a similar vein, Dodd (2000: 111–14) has emphasized that facts cannot be in
the world, since that would preclude their possibility of being false. He also provides a
well-documented discussion of the main motivations to declare non-obtaining facts as
entia non grata (162 ff). This explains, to some extent, Dodd’s defense of what he terms a
‘modest identity theory’, a picture that presupposes a clear-cut distinction between the
realms of sense and reference. My critique of the identity thesis is slightly different. I claim
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that, even if there were bipolar contents, one should show that perception-judgment
transitions are normally truth conducing. Given that McDowell (2005: 87) himself takes
reflection on truth for its own sake as ‘not particularly relevant’ for his argument, the
present line of attack should be more pressing for him.
25 See McDowell 1986, 1995, and Evans 1982: chapter 6. For a critical analysis of the
arguments in favor of disjunctivist theories of perception, see: Brewer 1999: 229 ff. and
Dokic 2001.
26 See Echeverri (in preparation).
27 ‘If moves in the space of reasons are not allowed to start from facts, riskily accepted
as such on the basis of such direct modes of cognitive contact with them as perception and
memory, then it becomes unintelligible how our picture can be a picture of a space whose
positions are connected by relations reason can exploit, such as that one of them is a
reliable ground for moving by inference to another’ (McDowell 1995: 409–410; emphasis
mine). In 1995: 402, McDowell explicitly introduces the requirement of ‘a cognitive
purchase on an objective fact’.
28 As McDowell (1995) rightly emphasizes, everybody has to acknowledge that, in the
good cases, ‘the world does one a favor’. However, if the world is populated both by
obtaining and non-obtaining facts, it is not clear how the world can do us the favor of
connecting our perceptual judgments to the right facts.
29 I introduce this picture in Echeverri (in preparation).
30 I presented a first draft of this paper at the University of Munich (8th February 2007).
I am indebted to professor Carlos U. Moulines and the audience of his graduate seminar
for raising a number of questions. Je´roˆme Dokic, Reinaldo Bernal, and Felipe Carvalho
read a second draft and discussed some parts of the paper. I hope their useful comments
led me to improve it. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee who provided me with
valuable comments, which led me to write section 7.
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